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REVISING DOMESTIC EXTRADITION LAW
JOHN J. MURPHYt
When a person is arrested in California for the commission of a
crime under the law of South Dakota, California does not prosecute the
person in its courts for violation of the laws of the other state. South
Dakota must, in the manner of a separate nation,1 request transfer of
custody to prosecute its laws in its own court. This proce-
dure-extradition-is currently set forth in a law promulgated in 1926.
The recently drafted Uniform Extradition and Rendition Acte is prof-
fered as a replacement of the old law.
Analysis of the proposed law initially requires analysis of the rea-
sons underlying the general approach to foreign states' criminal laws in
this country. Why is extradition necessary? Why do states refuse to
f Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. A.B. 1959, Harvard University;
LL.B. 1963, Boston University; LL.M. 1965, University of Illinois. The author was
the Reporter for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
UNIFORM ExTRADrrION AND RENDITION ACT, 11 U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 1983). He ex-
presses his appreciation to the University of Cincinnati College of Law for several
research grants that significantly assisted development of this Article.
1 For a discussion of the legal framework of extradition in international law, see
Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order, in BRITISH EXTRADI-
TION LAW AND PROCEDURE (V. Booth ed. 1974).
' 11 U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 1983). The Uniform Extradition and Rendition Act of
1980 is intended to supersede the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which was ap-
proved in 1926 and amended in 1932. The 1980 Act also supersedes the Uniform Ren-
dition of Accused Persons Act, approved in 1967.
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apply the penal laws of other states? Although this Article concludes
that many of the historical justifications for extradition have little valid-
ity today, it recognizes the need for extradition law given the remaining
vitality of some of the historical justifications as well as the territorial
presumptions built into state and federal constitutions. This Article
then examines the current law of extradition and finds it sufficiently
lacking to justify the energy of revision. Finally, this Article analyzes
the proposed extradition Act, and concludes that it should be adopted
by the states.
I. THE NECESSITY OF DOMESTIC EXTRADITION
Crimes and offenses against the laws of any State can only
be defined, prosecuted and pardoned by the sovereign au-
thority of that State; and the authorities, legislative, executive
or judicial, of other States take no action with regard to
them, except by way of extradition to surrender offenders to
the State whose laws they have violated, and whose peace
they have broken.'
The Supreme Court said this in 1892 in a civil suit brought by a
creditor to enforce a New York judgment against a debtor in a Mary-
land court. The issue for decision was whether the Maryland court had
a duty to recognize the New York judgment. Consequently, the Court's
comment about extradition was gratuitous. But the comment states a
truism: extradition4 -the process by which a fugitive is apprehended
and detained by the authorities of one state and delivered to another
state -is the only process used to deal with fugitives from the criminal
laws of another state.
Because it never happens, the possibility that an asylum state5
may apply the criminal law of the demanding state6 to a fugitive is
generally considered not worthy of analysis. If the forum court has ju-
I Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (emphasis added).
4 It has been suggested that the term "extradition" should apply only to the sur-
render of fugitives between nations, using "rendition" to refer to surrender between
states. See J. ScoTT, THE LAW OF INTERSTATE RENDITION § 1 (1917); S. SPEAR,
LAW OF RENDITION (2d ed. 1884); Kopelman, Extradition and Rendition-History,
Law, Recommendations, 14 B.U.L. REv. 591, 592, 624 (1934); Note, Interstate Rendi-
tion and the Fourth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 551, 551 n.1 (1970). The
uniform statute currently controlling the surrender of fugitives between states refers to
the process as "extradition," see Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 11 U.L.A. 59-304
(1974); the terminology of the statute is employed throughout this Article.
"Asylum" state refers to the state in which the fugitive is arrested.
* "Demanding" state refers to the state that has suffered the alleged offense to its
criminal laws and is requesting custody of the fugitive for prosecution and punishment.
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risdiction, the governing law in a prosecution is always that of the fo-
rum state.7 In this respect, criminal law cases are a nonproblem in con-
flicts of law.8 While noting that "[c]onflict of law covers an extremely
wide area, embracing all situations where the affairs of men cut across
state lines,"' the Restatement of Conflict of Laws excludes criminal law
from its coverage.10
Justice Holmes once observed that analysis of ideas about law
tends to cease when they "become encysted in phrases.""" This appears
to be what has happened to the question of what prevents the courts of
an asylum state from applying another state's penal law. In one of the
few discussions of domestic criminal law by contemporary conflict-of-
law scholars, the question is given the orthodox response: "crime is lo-
cal."' 2 That phrase has spawned others such as "the courts of no state
execute the penal laws of another."' 3 Brainard Currie noted that
"criminal cases having foreign aspects tend to fall between two stools,
in the academic world at least."1" Although in his opinion criminal
cases deserve careful study, "they are given scant attention either in the
course on conflict of laws or in criminal law courses."' 5 A review of the
literature finds only a few serious suggestions that a state try a person
charged with violating another state's penal laws.'8 An author who
made such a suggestion nearly fifty years ago appeared overwhelmed
by the problems of one state assuming responsibility for the prosecu-
tion, adjudication, and sentencing policy of another state. He doomed
" R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 224-25 (3d ed. 1977); W. REESE &
M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 456 n.4 (7th ed. 1978).
' "There seems to be universal agreement that if a court takes jurisdiction in a
criminal case it will apply only its own penal law. Hence criminal law cases do not
involve choice-of-law questions in the ordinary sense." W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG,
supra note 7, at 456 n.4. Robert Leflar views the universal similarity of answer in
criminal law to the questions of jurisdiction and governing substantive law as "almost
but not quite unique in conflicts law." R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 224.
* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 comment a (1969).
10 Id. at § 2 comment c.
n Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912).
12 R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 223. The most frequently cited source for the
phrase "crime is local" is a comment by Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825): "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another ... " Although this statement was in the context of a discussion of the en-
forcement of penal laws by a foreign country, the comment is cited as a basis for the
refusal by one state to apply the criminal laws of another state. See, e.g., Rotenberg,
Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEx. L. REv.
763, 764 (1960).
13 B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 341 (1963).
14 Id. at 655.
1 Id.
16 See E. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL LAWS 25 (1936); Levitt, Jurisdiction
Over Crimes-I1, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 495, 498 (1926).
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his own proposal by recommending "deportation to the state whose law
was violated"1 as a sentence for all foreign law violators.
In the past few decades, states have already ceded to each other the
execution of part of the policies of state criminal justice. This has been
accomplished by the use of interstate compacts. For example, all states
have authorized their governors to contract with any other state to per-
mit qualified convicted persons to serve their parole or probation period
in another state.18 The receiving state assumes the duties of supervision
over probationers and parolees; the standards for these duties are those
of the receiving state, not those of the state that adopted the policy of
probation or parole as the appropriate correction policy for the con-
victed person.1 Moreover, the prosecution of crimes committed on state
boundary rivers and lakes is brought under interstate compacts giving
adjacent states concurrent jurisdiction. The theory, however, is that the
forum state is enforcing its own law, which is made applicable by mu-
tual agreement to the entire area of the river or lake. 0
Consider a hypothetical that presents both the policy and legal is-
sues involved in an asylum state's applying the criminal law of a de-
manding state to a fugitive. States adopt legislation enabling the gover-
nor to enter into a compact, the form of which is specified in the
legislation. The compact essentially permits the governor to adopt enu-
merated procedures in lieu of extradition regarding fugitives found in
other states that are parties to the compact. The fugitive must be the
subject of an arrest warrant for the commission of listed crimes, or for
the violation of any term of bail, probation, or an order arising out of a
criminal proceeding.21 The procedures include adjudication of the guilt
or innocence of the fugitive by the courts of foreign states that are par-
ties to the compact.
22
17 E. STiMSON, supra note 16, at 26.
15 For a table of citations to state enabling acts, see COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 8 (1978).
1o See, e.g., VA. CODE § 53.1-167(2) (1982).
3o See, e.g., State v. Holden, 46 N.J. 361, 217 A.2d 132 (1966); Padgett v. State,
151 Ark. 290, 236 S.W. 603 (1922).
21 This is an attempt to parallel the language of the scope of the Uniform Act.
UNIFORM EXTRADIriON AND RENDITION ACT § 3-102(3), 11 U.L.A. 111 (Supp.
1983).18 The hypothetical is intended only to raise a realistic possibility of the applica-
tion of one state's penal substantive laws by another state. Of course, conflict between
the procedural, evidentiary, and dispositional laws of the two states could occur.
The compact clause requires consent of Congress to "any Agreement or Compact
with another State." Any compact not "directed to the formation of any combination
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States," is not within the scope of the
compact clause and does not require congressional consent. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S.
433, 440 (1981). Arguably, Congress could legislate the area covered by the hypotheti-
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The hypothetical legislation could replace the current system of
extradition. The legislation, however, would run afoul of the age-old
prohibition against applying another state's criminal law. To the extent
they retain force today, the historical justifications for that prohibition
do not support the refusal to apply a foreign state's criminal law in all
circumstances. They do, however, support the refusal in some circum-
stances. Moreover, state and federal constitutional barriers would ham-
per any attempt to scrap the current approach in favor of a system like
that posed in the hypothetical in which states generally enforce each
other's criminal laws. Domestic extradition laws therefore remain
necessary.
A. Some Historical Bases for Extradition
Three primary reasons have been repeated for decades to justify
the rigid refusal by states to enforce the criminal laws of other states:
the dissimilarity of state laws, the need for asylum, and practical incon-
veniences in enforcing a foreign state's criminal law.2 Examination of
cal compact under either the commerce clause or the extradition clause. This would
render the compact subject to congressional consent, see id. at 442 n.10, because it
would encroach upon federal power. But an equally strong responsive argument could
be made-Congress consented in advance.
The Crime Control Consent Act of 1934 states, "Itlhe consent of Congress is
hereby given to any two or more States to enter into agreements or compacts for coop-
erative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement
of their respective criminal laws and policies." 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1976). Congress may
consent to an interstate compact in advance, Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 441, and the congres-
sional history of the Act establishes that it was adopted for the purpose of complying
with the compact clause. See S. RE'. No. 1007, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
The maintenance of interstate order commends the hypothetical compact. It is a
state interest for which Congress adopted the Act providing advance consent to inter-
state schemes for the enforcement of state criminal laws.
The rapidity with which persons may move from one State to another,
those charged with crimes . . . , and the fact that there are no barriers
between the States obstructing this movement, makes it necessary. . . that
the States by mutual agreement shall aid each other in the detection and
punishment of offenders against their respective criminal laws.
S. REP. No. 1007, supra, at 21. Although speaking of choice of law, Robert Leflar
recently identified the interest in the maintenance of interstate order as an emerging
interest. "The society and the economy of the United States today pay less attention to
state lines than in years gone by, and important governmental interests are in many
respects interstate. . . in their legal identifications. . . . These governmental interests
are larger matters such as . . . maintenance of interstate and international order." R.
LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 119. Professor Leflar urged that this interest was often supe-
rior to the interests inherent in localized law. See id. An interstate compact, therefore,
is one alternative available to pursue this interest.
" A summary of the historical reasons for this rule first appeared in 1932 in
Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 193-201 (1932). Professor Leflar repeated these reasons for the same rule in
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those reasons reveals that they no longer justify-if they ever did-a
blanket refusal to enforce the criminal laws of foreign states. Neverthe-
less, they do justify the refusal in some circumstances.
1. Dissimilarity of State Laws
It is often assumed that the values and mores of states are dissimi-
lar, and that this dissimilarity is reflected in the variation among state
laws. This proposition led to three policies, one of which is still ap-
plied, concerning enforcement of foreign states' laws. The first denied
enforcement of civil claims based on another state's dissimilar laws.
The second denied enforcement of civil laws of another state when the
forum deemed those laws to be penal in nature. The third simply de-
nies enforcement of the criminal laws of any other state.
There has been a gradual and nearly total collapse of the notion
that socioeconomic values of the states differ sufficiently to justify denial
of access to a state court for a cause of action valid under the law of a
sister state. 4 It is unusual for a claim based upon the law of one state
to be found so inconsistent with the public policy of the forum state
that the claimant is denied access to court. "It is a rare case in which a
claim validly existing under the law of one American state can be said
to be so far outside the pale of social, economic and moral standards
currently imposed by our civilization as to be violative of the strong
1977 as:
(1) historical reasons based on the intensely local character of early legal
systems, including the fact of collective responsibility of the community for
acts done within its borders and the notion of the trial body as a jury of
neighbors personally acquainted with the facts in the case; (2) respect for
the sovereign rights and pretensions of foreign states and nations, coupled
with the idea that the diplomatic processes of extradition and interstate
rendition would give adequate relief against absconding parties; (3) proce-
dural difficulties, such as . . .the traditional procedure in criminal cases
of action brought by the injured state as a plaintiff; (4) local public policy
opposing the type of claim. . .; (5) . . .practical inconveniences, partic-
ularly (a) the added expense to taxpayers of conducting trials and enforc-
ing sentences . . .coupled with possible overcrowding of dockets by un-
necessarily imported [prosecutions], (b) expense and hardship to the
defendant from having to appear with witnesses at a distance from the
place where the events in question occurred, (c) possibly increased diffi-
culty of reliable proof of facts at a distance from the place of their occur-
rence, and (d) possible ignorance and difficulty of proof of foreign law as
such; (6) American constitutional guaranties to criminal defendants of the
right to trial by jury in the vicinity of the offense.
R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 223.
"' See generally Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE
L.J. 1; Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cim. L. REv. 9, 28 (1958); Leflar, supra note 23; Com-
ment, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal Laws, 25 U. CHi. L. Rav. 187 (1957).
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public policy of any sister state."25
This general acceptance of foreign-based causes of action was not
at one time the rule. Many states had adopted a position that a claim
based upon a foreign state's statute would not be heard if the statute
was substantially dissimilar to the one at the forum dealing with the
same matter.26 The dissimilarity rule now has generally been rejected
by the states. In its stead, the states have adopted a narrow public pol-
icy exception to the application of a foreign state's law.2
For example, in Intercontinental Hotels v. Golden, 2  the defen-
dant was sued in New York on promissory notes he had given for gam-
bling debts in the plaintiff's casino in Puerto Rico. The contracts would
not have been valid under the law of New York, but they were valid
under Puerto Rican law. Defendant's argument that the cause of action
should be dismissed because of inconsistency with New York's public
policy was rejected, and recovery on the Puerto Rican gambling con-
tracts was permitted. The public policy aversion to entertaining civil
claims based upon the laws of sister states forbade recovery only on
claims that were "inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking
to the prevailing moral sense."'29
At the turn of the century, states frequently denied plaintiffs access
to their courts for foreign-based claims such as wrongful death or treble
damages on the ground that the claims were penal in nature.30 Princi-
pally through a redefinition of "penal," most states have now broken
away from the rule denying enforcement of extrastate civil claims with
penal elements. 31 Since World War II, laws setting double or treble
damages have been interpreted by courts as nonpenal even where the
remedy is designed to punish the violator.3 2 "Though the penalty rule
is not dead, it has only a fraction of the strength that it possessed at the
, R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 91-92.
U See, e.g., Davis v. Ruzicka, 170 Md. 112, 183 A. 569 (1936); Annot., 77
A.L.R. 1311 (1932).
17 See R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 90.
2 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964).
29 Id. at 13, 203 N.E.2d at 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 529. See Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d
178 (1976).
30 See, e.g., Raisor v. Chicago & A.R. Co., 215 Ill. 47, 50-51, 74 N.E. 69, 71
(1905); Mohr v. Sands, 44 Okla. 330, 339, 133 P. 238, 241 (1913). For an exhaustive
compilation of the types of foreign civil claims that were examined by states for "penal"
elements, see Kutner, Judicial Identification of "Penal Laws" in the Conflict of Laws,
31 OKLA. L. Rav. 590 (1978).
3 R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 93.
3 See Chavarnia v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1076-77, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 549, 551-52 (1974); Tulsa Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. McMichael Concrete
Co., 495 P.2d 1279 (Okla. 1972); Newman v. George A. Fuller Co., 72 R.I. 113, 48
A.2d 345 (1946).
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turn of the century."3
There has been a major weakening of the notion that the socio-
economic values of the states differ to such an extent that access to a
state's court should be denied for the enforcement of civil claims based
on the laws of another state-even civil claims with penal elements.
What remains of the view that foreign-state civil claims are not to be
enforced because they are either penal or against the forum state's pub-
lic policy is largely vestigial. The breakdown in this barrier to enforce-
ment of foreign state claims, however, has not occurred with respect to
criminal statutes. Differences among states' substantive criminal laws
can no longer be the basis for refusing enforcement. There has been a
generally unchronicled drive toward uniformity in determining what
constitutes a crime and what may be done with the offender. A trans-
formation is under way in this area, once characterized by a melange of
particularized criminal laws explained only by the history of each state:
states now share provisions about general principles of criminal law,
about conduct deemed criminal, and about criminal penalties."
Although there were early efforts at drafting a model code of crim-
s R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 94.
8' Much of the writing about the recent codification of state substantive criminal
law has been by the author of the Model Penal Code, Herbert Wechsler. See, e.g.,
Wechsler, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Criminal Law, in
CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 419 (R. Hood ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as Codification]; Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1097 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Challenge]; Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of Substan-
tive Law, 45 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 524 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
A Thoughtful Code].
For discussion of the circumstances of early efforts at criminal law codification in
England and the United States, see Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's
Predecessors, 78 COLUM L. REv., 1098 (1978).
There has been a number of articles on recent enactments by individual states of
criminal codes based upon the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., Bowman, The Illinois
Criminal Code of 1961 and Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, 4 J.L. REFORM 461
(1971); Cohen, Reflections on the Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45 TEx. L. REv.
413 (1967); Fox, The Proposed Criminal Code for New Hampshire, 11 N.H.B.J. 262
(1969); Hurri, The Three R's of Penal Law Reform, 51 OR. L. REV. 427 (1972);
Keeton & Reid, Proposed Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45 Tax. L. REv. 399
(1967); Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky: Part I-Homicide and Assault,
58 Ky. L.J. 242 (1970); Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky: Part
I1-Inchoate Crimes, 58 Ky. L.J. 695 (1970); Symposium on Revised New York Penal
Law, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1968-69); Symposium on the New Kentucky Penal
Code, 61 Ky. L.J. 620 (1973); Proposed Missouri Criminal Code, 38 Mo. L. REv. 361
(1973); The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code-Reform and Regression, 33 OHIo ST.
L.J. 351 (1972); The Revised Washington Criminal Code, 48 WASH. L. REv. 1
(1972); The Process of Penal Law Reform- A Look at the Proposed Michigan Revised
Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 772 (1968); Student Symposium on the Proposed
California Criminal Code, 19 UCLA L. REv. 525 (1972); Note, The Proposed Penal
Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1469 (1964); see also Wilson, State Criminal
Law Revision, 3 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 198 (1965).
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inal law for the states, 5 few states adopted the proposed codes.36 From
the turn of the century until the early 1970's, state substantive criminal
law was far from harmonious. When work on the Model Penal Code
began, the drafter described the disarray in state criminal law:
As our statutes stand at present they are disorganized and
often accidental in their coverage, a medley of enactment and
of common law, far more important in their gloss than in
their text even in cases where the text is fairly full, a combi-
nation of the old and of the new that only history explains.8"
State substantive criminal law had been steadily augmented by particu-
lar laws "responding to the pressures and excitements that arose from
time to time."38 It soon became evident that the American Law Insti-
tute's approach in other areas of law could not be duplicated in the
criminal law. The process of restating the common law of contracts,
torts, property, and the like could not be used effectively with state
criminal law. "Its statutory content was too large and too uneven for
such treatment and the need . . . was for a guide to long-delayed
reform."3 9
Work on the Model Penal Code, begun in 1952, took ten years to
produce a final draft. The varying and frequently inconsistent positions
in state criminal law were evaluated and choices made for all states to
adopt. With the exception of an occasional classic article synthesizing
existing state criminal law, 0 the seminal scholarly work had not been
provided by treatise writers. As the drafter of the code noted when the
examination of state substantive criminal law began in 1952, "[n]o
Williston or Wigmore has undertaken to chart the contours of the sub-
ject, ordering its doctrines, rules and practice in the light of underlying
policies and bringing critical intelligence to bear upon the whole. 1
The result was a code that was the product of a decade of collabo-
rative work by persons from all of the disciplines concerned with crimi-
nal problems. It was more thorough than the work that produced the
prior codes, usually the product of one person working for two to three
years.42 Thirteen tentative drafts of the Model Penal Code were pro-
35 See Kadish, supra note 34.
36 One exception was the adoption of the Field Penal Code by California in 1872,
which led to successive adoption by six other Western states. Id. at 1137-38.
37 A Thoughtful Code, supra note 34, at 526.
38 Codification, supra note 34, at 420.
39 Id. at 421.
40 See, e.g., Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37
COLUM. L. REv. 701 (1937).
41 Challenge, supra note 34, at 1098.
42 See Kadish, supra note 34.
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duced before the final version was adopted. Each draft was accompa-
nied by comprehensive commentary and integrative analysis. The text
and the commentary "furnished a text that revitalized criminal law
scholarship, providing a new starting point for writing in the field and
profoundly influenced the materials and direction of criminal law study
in American law schools.
' 43
In 1977, the drafter of the code, Professor Wechsler, stated mod-
estly that the Institute's initial objective was not to achieve uniformity
in state criminal law. Substantial variation would be inevitable due to
anticipated differences of social situations among the states. 4 4 Yet uni-
formity was an aspiration, and a large measure of it seems to have been
achieved. "Of course, the [American Law] Institute was not without
ambition that in such an enterprise the model might seem worthy of
adoption . . .,.
The code stimulated revision of state substantive criminal law and
injected uniformity in state determinations of what conduct is criminal
and how an offender should be treated. Beginning in the 1960's, thirty-
six states produced new codes of substantive criminal law.46 Seventeen
of these new codes were enacted in 1975 or later. By April 1980, five
additional states and Congress had completed substantive penal code
revisions, while two other states were in the process of revision. 7
Although the code has been adopted as a whole in very few in-
stances, the code's formulations have now substantially transformed the
criminal laws of the states.48 The code's effect was to spark reconsider-
43 Id. at 1140.
44 Codification, supra note 34, at 422.
45 Id.
46 A list of 36 states was compiled as of April 1980, and appears at 57 A.L.I.
PROC. 553 (1980).
47 See id.
48 Kadish, supra note 34, at 1144.
Although a precise compilation of section-by-section adoption by states of code
provisions and variations has not been published, the comments to the individual state
codifications demonstrate the enormous impact of the code on state substantive criminal
law, and the influence of each state code on others. An example is the commentary to
the new criminal code of Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A (1978), effective in May 1978.
The comment to the provision dealing with the effect of ignorance or mistake states that
the provision was taken from the Michigan and New York codes, which in turn were
based upon the Model Penal Code. See id. § 13A-2-6 commentary. The Alabama
code's formulation of other defenses such as mental disease or intoxication are similarly
derived. See id. § 13A-3-1 commentary; id. § 13A-3-2 commentary. The specification
of conduct deemed criminal is also largely borrowed from other state codes that are in
turn based upon the code. See id. §§ 13A-6-3 to 13A-6-4, 13A-8-16 (covering man-
slaughter, negligent homicide, and receiving stolen property). Finally Alabama's ap-
proach to sentencing is to adopt the code's remedy of relating sentencing to a simple
system of classification of crimes: "This section [Alabama's statute classifying all
crimes] is derived primarily from Model Penal Code § 601, New York Revised Penal
[Vol. 131:1063
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ation of criminal law problems, and with some exceptions49 the code's
approach was mirrored in the new state codes and current proposals.
For example, the code's formulation on the significance of mental dis-
ease as exculpation has been enacted verbatim or in substance in the
new state codes.50 The code took no position on the question of the
abolition of capital punishment,51 but it did promote the elimination of
degrees of murder and the liberalization of criteria for mitigation. In
these areas, the code has been widely followed.52 The code's treatment
of the inchoate crimes (attempt and conspiracy), theft, and other spe-
cific crimes has also been widely recognized in the new codes and pro-
posed revisions."
Prior to the adoption of the code, the statutes governing prison
sentences varied considerably among the states; even within a given
state, the statutes were often inconsistent as to the nature and duration
of sentences upon conviction." The code introduced reason and equal-
ity in this area by categorizing all crimes and relating punishment to
the category. All of the current revisions of the state criminal laws pro-
ceed on this premise and approximate the code's approach. 5
The historically asserted dissimilarity of state criminal laws to a
large extent no longer prevails. Thus, for the same reason that different
values underlying differences in states' laws can no longer justify a re-
fusal to enforce a foreign state's civil and quasi-penal laws, neither
should such differences pose a bar to enforcement of a foreign state's
Code § 55.05 and Michigan Revised Criminal Code § 1201. It indicates the classifica-
tions used for felonies, misdemeanors and violations, which are important only when
sentence is involved." Id. § 13A-5-3.
'1 For example, the code attacks the notion of strict liability in criminal law. It
creates a grade of offense called a "violation," for which no sentence other than a fine
or forfeiture may be imposed. A violation "does not constitute a crime," and conviction
of such an offense "shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on
conviction of a criminal offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). New York adopted the notion of a "violation" but authorized a sentence
of imprisonment for up to fifteen days. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00.3, 55.10.3, 70.15.4
(McKinney 1975); see id. § 15.15.2. Other states have followed New York's example
on this point rather than the model code. See Codification, supra note 34, at 419, 439
& n.61.
50 Codification, supra note 34, at 445-46.
"I For a discussion of the practical problems encountered in revising state substan-
tive criminal law, particularly when the revision considers issues already in public de-
bate, see Fox, Reflection on the Law Reforning Process, 4 J.L. REFORM 443 (1971);
Sherry, The Politics of Criminal Law Reform: The United States, 21 AM. J. COMP. L.
201 (1973).
52 Codification, supra note 34, at 453.
53 Id. at 455-58.
"' For the state of the law prior to the code, see Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction
and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 472-75 (1961).
55 Codification, supra note 34, at 461.
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criminal laws.
2. The Need for Asylum
[Tihey [the asylum states] are not sending him for trial to an
alien jurisdiction, with laws which our standards might con-
demn, but are simply returning him to be tried, still under
the protection of the Federal Constitution but in the manner
provided by the State against the laws of which it is charged
that he has offended."
This comment by the Supreme Court in 1917 suggested that ex-
tradition among the states operated within the context of shared mini-
mum decencies among all the states in the investigation, trial, and sen-
tencing process for all defendants. The protections of the federal
Constitution, so it appeared, precluded any jurisdiction from using pro-
cedures violative of a common standard shared by all the states. But at
least until the 1960's, whether the principle was reflected in practice
was quite doubtful.
One of the fascinating historical aspects of extradition law was its
function as a guardian of civil rights. For many years, the extradition
process protected persons from discriminatory application of the trial
process, threatened civil rights violations-including the ultimate viola-
tion of lynching-and poor prison conditions. This use of extradition
probably began in 1860 with the refusal of the Governor of Ohio to
extradite a resident accused of assisting a slave to reach freedom in
another state. This case, Kentucky v. Dennison,57 established that a
governor's duty to extradite from the asylum state is discretionary inas-
much as his performance cannot be compelled through federal process.
Gubernatorial refusals to extradite based on past or anticipated civil
rights violations constituted the most severe interstate conflicts that
arose in the context of the extradition process. For example, in 1937
Governor Hurley of Massachusetts refused to extradite a black man
who had escaped from the chain gang of another state.58 Newspaper
accounts of extradition connect that process to a concern for prison con-
ditions or lynchings. 59 Such concerns have led to publicly reported con-
" Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917).
857 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
" N.Y. Times, July 28, 1937, at 9, col. 2.
" See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1956, at 42, col. 4; id., Jan. 16, 1924, at 40, col.
2; id., Mar. 6, 1943, at 6, col. 2. For other examples, see Comment, Interstate Rendi-
tion: Executive Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 YALE L.J. 97, 110 n.74
(1956).
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flicts between governors, some of whom would retaliate for refusals by
other states to extradite because of such civil rights concerns."
Although perhaps now of only historical note,"' the governors
were not alone in using the extradition process as a barrier to potential
due process violations in the demanding states. In Commonwealth v.
Superintendent of County Prison,6" a 1943 case, a black man was
sought by Georgia from the asylum state of Pennsylvania for trial on
the charge of assault with intent to kill. During a hearing on an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus, a Pennsylvania court admitted evi-
dence by the fugitive that prejudice against him in Georgia was so viru-
lent that he could not receive a fair trial and that he was in danger of
being lynched. The court held this evidence sufficient reason for deny-
ing extradition notwithstanding Georgia's undisputed compliance with
the extradition laws.
These historical accounts demonstrate that the Supreme Court's
assumption of the existence of common decencies of due process as the
backdrop for extradition was not shared by the states. The discretion-
ary extradition process thus provided a means by which the asylum
state could protect a fugitive from uncivilized practices in the demand-
ing state. Of course, an asylum state's interest in protecting fugitives
from other states would in no way be slighted by permitting the asylum
state to apply the foreign state's criminal laws: by conducting the trial
itself, the asylum state could provide the fugitive with the rights he
might be denied in the demanding state. But no given state will always
be an asylum state: every state will on occasion be a demanding state. If
states did not abide by the same general standards of fairness, the hypo-
thetical arrangement for enforcing foreign states' criminal laws would
harm the interests of demanding states currently protected by the re-
fusal to apply foreign criminal law. The current system ensures hu-
mane states that their criminal laws are not enforced in a barbaric
fashion; that interest is not protected by the hypothetical compact for
o See N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1925, at 4, col. 2; id. Dec. 29, 1927, at 3, col. 4. For
a public statement of a recent conflict between the governors of California and South
Dakota over California's refusal to turn over a person accused of crimes in South Da-
kota, see id., June 13, 1982, at 63, col. 3.
1 See infra note 251 (discussing recent case that may sharply limit the issues that
may be raised at habeas corpus hearings challenging extradition because of anticipated
civil rights violations in the demanding state).
62 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A.2d 576 (1943). For cases in which defendants made
similar pleas unsuccessfully, see Murray v. Burns, 48 Hawaii 508, 405 P.2d 309
(1965); People ex rel. Hogan v. Ogilvie, 35 111. 2d 95, 219 N.E.2d 491 (1966); State ex
rel. LaRose v. Granquist, 273 Minn. 231, 140 N.W.2d 700 (1966); Koch v. O'Brien,
101 N.H. 11, 131 A.2d 63 (1957); Stewart v. State, 3 Or. App. 620, 475 P.2d 600
(1970).
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mutual enforcement of foreign states' criminal laws.
The need for extradition to function as a civil rights equalizer,
however, has been substantially reduced by the emergence of new legal
doctrines within the past fifteen years. The fourteenth amendment,
adopted in 1868, has been read by a majority of the Court to make the
Bill of Rights selectively applicable to the states. The result is a set of
decencies shared by all states in pre-trial, trial, and corrections proce-
dures. The set of common decencies includes the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence,6 3 the privilege against self-incrimination,4 the exclu-
sion of involuntary confessions, 65 and the right to compulsory process to
obtain witnesses."6 They also include the right to free counsel at trial,
67
on appeal,6" and at sentence and probation-violation hearings,69 the
right to a speedy trial,10 and the right to jury trial.1 As applied to the
states, the eighth amendment proscribes deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious medical needs, 2 and includes the prisoners' right to
challenge prison conditions."
Moreover, changes in the construction of federal statutes now sub-
ject state officials to both criminal and civil liability for more civil rights
violations. Before those changes, the federal statutes did not even pro-
vide protection for victims of lynching.1 4 Until 1945, the federal crimi-
63 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S 643 (1961).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
65 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
17 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
69 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (counsel required in post-trial pro-
ceeding for revocation of probation and imposition of deferred sentencing); cf. Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (though state is not constitutionally obliged to provide
counsel in probationary hearings, it should generally do so if indigent probationer has
difficulty presenting facts or alleges innocence of probation violation and requests
counsel).
70 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
71 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (where federal law would require a
jury trial).
71 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
11 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (states must protect the right of inmates
to access to courts); cf. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (living conditions
in state prison may be challenged).
"' There were scattered efforts by states to punish perpetrators of lynchings. In
1928, the Virginia Senate passed by a 32-9 vote a law named after its sponsor, Gover-
nor Byrd, the Byrd Anti-Lynching law. Under its provisions, lynching became a state
offense and required the county or city where the lynching occured to pay $2,500 to the
beneficiaries of the person lynched. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1928, at 6, col. 3. The
infrequency with which legal remedies for lynchings were granted is reflected in a
newspaper report of the details of a jury award to the parents of a lynched black youth
aged 16. The award occurred in 1936 and was described as the first of its kind on
record. See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1936, at 3, col. 7.
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nal statute was rendered useless against lynchers by a paradoxical ar-
gument. The argument asserted that state officials who violated state
law by beating persons accused of crimes were not acting under color of
state law. Thus a necessary element of the crime was not present. The
immunity was complete in light of the fact that there was little likeli-
hood of state or local prosecution.75 This tragic promotion of lawless-
ness ended in 1945 with Screws v. United States.7 In Monroe v.
Pape,7 the Court likewise found federal civil liability under the civil
rights statutes even though the state officers' actions violated state law.
Although Monroe had held that cities were absolutely immune from
damages for violations of the civil rights statutes, this major obstacle to
the civil remedy for lawless action by state officials against persons in
their custody was removed in 1978 in Monell v. Department of Social
Services,78 in which the Court concluded that cities could be sued di-
rectly for legal and equitable relief when the alleged action "imple-
ments . . . or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or de-
cision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers."7 9
3. Inconveniences
The expense and hardship incurred by both the defendant and the
asylum state in defending against and prosecuting a charge of the viola-
tion of the penal laws of a distant state are obvious. Not all fugitives,
however, are similarly situated in terms of the practical inconveniences
in defending against a criminal charge in the asylum state. This is also
true with respect to the asylum state's burden in prosecuting the fugi-
tive. In a substantial number of cases, interstate retrieval is not neces-
sary to avoid hardship to the defendant or to the asylum state in adjudi-
cating the foreign criminal charge.
The nation's population includes substantial centers that spread
across state lines and are socially and economically integrated. 80 Nearly
Dean Bell traces in detail the failure of the legal system to deal effectively with
civil rights violations from the Civil War to very recent times. See D. BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 207-34 (1980).
11 See D. BELL, supra note 74, at 211.
76 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
7 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
78 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
79 Id. at 690.
11 A standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA),
[als defined for official U.S. government use by the Department of Com-
merce, includes a City of more than 50,000 population and the county in
which the City is located, plus other counties that exhibit strong ties with
the City according to certain specific criteria. SMSA's, except in the New
England States, are comprised of entire counties of a wide range of statis-
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tical material. In New England the SMSA's are defined in terms of towns.
RAND McNALLY COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE 93 (113th ed. 1982).
A standard consolidated statistical area (SCSA)
[i]ncludes one SMSA with a minimum population of 1,000,000 plus one
or more adjoining SMSA's. The combination of SMSA's must be related
in that continuously developed high density population corridors and'
metro commuting of workers are Similar Characteristics of the Contiguous
Area. Thus the Analysis of data for larger metro complexes is facilitated.
Id.
The determination whether an SMSA or SCSA crossed state boundaries was made
by examining the "Current Population and Sales Data For Standard Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas." See id. at 90-93.
The following are thirty-two SMSA's and four SCSA's that cross state borders:
SMSA Population
1. Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, Pa.-N.J. 636,714
2. Augusta, Ga.-S.C. 327,372
3. Binghamton, N.Y.-Pa. 301,336
4. Chattanooga, Tenn.-Ga. 426,540
5. Columbus, Ga.-Ala. 239,196
6. Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, Iowa-Ill. 383,958
7. Duluth-Superior, Minn.-Wis. 265,650
8. Evansville, Ind.-Ky. 309,408
9. Fall River, Mass.-R.I. 176,831
10. Fargo-Moorhead, N.D.-Minn. 137,574
11. Fort Smith, Ark.-Okla. 203,269
12. Huntington-Ashland, W. Va.-Ky.-Ohio 311,350
13. Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, Tenn.-Va. 433,638
14. Kansas City, Mo.-Kan. 1,327,020
15. Louisville, Ky.-Ind. 906,240
16. Memphis, Tenn.-Ark. 912,887
17. Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.-Wis. 2,114,256
18. New London-Norwich, Conn.-R.I. 248,554
•19. Norfolk-Va. Beach-Portsmouth, Va.-N.C. 806,691
20. Omaha, Neb.-Iowa 570,399
21. Philadelphia, Pa.-N.J. 4,716,818
22. Portland, Or.-Wash. 1,242,187
23. Providence-Pawtucket-Warwick, R.I.-Mass. 919,216
24. St. Louis, Mo.-Ill. 2,355,276
25. Sioux City, Iowa-Neb. 117,457
26. Springfield-Chicopee-Holyoke, Mass.-Conn. 530,668
27. Steubenville-Weirton, Ohio-W. Va. 163,099
28. Texarkana, Tex.-Ark. 127,019
29. Toledo, Ohio-Mich. 791,599
30. Washington, D.C.-Md.-Va. 3,060,240
31. Wheeling, W. Va.-Ohio 185,566
32. Wilmington, Del.-N.J.-Md. 524,108
SCSA
1. Boston-Lawrence-Lowell, Mass.-N.H. 3,448,122
2. Chicago, I1.-Northwestern Ind. 7,868,216
3. Cincinati-Hamilton, Ohio-Ky.-Ind. 1,660,190
4. New York City, N.Y.-N.J. 16,120,023
Total 54,869,717
The total population of the United States as of 1980 was 226,504,825, see id. at
58. Thus 24.2% of the population lives in SMSA's or SCSA's that cross state
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twenty-five percent of the nation lives in these areas."1 Each state bor-
der in these areas marks an artificial territorial limitation on the execu-
tion of the state's policy on criminal justice. In these metropolitan ar-
eas, a substantial number of retrievals are for short distances albeit
across state borders.8 2 Crossing a state border in these cases is not nec-
essary to avoid inconvenience to the fugitive in defense or to the asylum
state in prosecution.
A compact between states sharing population centers to apply each
other's penal laws is sensible. Assuming that the compact was limited
to particular crimes that are uniformly proscribed by the statutes of
each state and carry similar ranges of punishment, there should be little
trouble regarding ignorance and difficulty of proof of foreign law. The
added expense of imported prosecutions and potential overcrowding of
dockets could be managed by trade-offs in the compact leading to re-
duced expenses by exporting certain prosecutions to the neighbor state.
The place of the alleged crime and the place of arrest would be a so-
cially and economically integrated area. Consequently, there should be
no hardship to the accused or to the prosecuting asylum state in investi-
gation and discovery. If necessary, the testimony of recalcitrant wit-
nesses could be secured under the provisions of the Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings, adopted by every state but Alabama. 3 Given these practi-
cal advantages of a limited interstate compact authorizing neighbor
states to apply each other's penal law, the current system's insistence on
extradition in all cases appears as antiquated as a catapult. It protects
neither interstate harmony nor the civil rights of fugitives where a
crime and the apprehension of the accused occur within a metropolitan
area.
There is a helpful analogy in rule 40 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, adopted to govern cases in which fugitives were
under arrest in federal districts other than those in which their prosecu-
tions were pending. The rule sets forth two types of cases. First were
those in which the place of arrest is either in another federal district of
the same state or, if in another state, less than 100 miles from the place
of the pending prosecution; the second were cases in which the arrest
occurs 100 miles or more from the place of the pending prosecution and
in a different state. The distinction drawn by the drafters of rule 40
boundaries.
S1 See supra note 80.
'2 See UNIFORM EXTRADITION AND RENDITION AcT prefatory note at 5 n.2
(National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1980).
s1 11 U.L.A. 1-31 (master ed. 1974 & Supp. 1982).
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was not for the purpose of managing a conflict-of-laws problem: the
substantive criminal laws in both types of cases would be federal law.
The distinction was drawn to determine which cases deserve a separate
removal proceeding. Under the rule, removal proceedings were abol-
ished for the first type of cases.
The premise of the rule is that all persons arrested are not simi-
larly situated in terms of inconvenience where the place of arrest is
other than the location of the alleged crime. In rule 40, the law on
removal proceedings differs depending upon whether the arrest is 100
miles from the place of the pending prosecution. Reports of the 1946
debates among the drafters of rule 40 clearly show that the rule was
predicated upon an estimate of the inconvenience to an accused arising
from an arrest at a place distant from the location of the crime. 4 Judge
Holtzoff rejected proposals by the representative of the Justice Depart-
ment to measure the 100-mile limit "as the crow flies." Since the rule
sought to estimate the relative degrees of inconvenience to persons sub-
jected to retrievals, measurement of 100 miles by straight line "would
introduce a much longer distance than we had in mind."8" The drafters
agreed that the distance should be measured by the customarily trav-
elled route, and this test has been adopted by courts interpreting the
federal removal rule. 6
Rule 40 abolished removal proceedings for persons arrested within
a 100-mile radius of the pending prosecution. After a preliminary hear-
ing, persons arrested within the 100-mile radius are removed to the
place of the pending prosecution. The theory of the rule is that, as a
practical matter, the defendant is not disadvantaged by the summary
removal. Nor would an interstate compact permitting states to apply
the foreign penal law allegedly violated by the fugitive disadvantage a
fugitive if the place of arrest and the locus of the crime were both
within a socially and economically integrated metropolitan area strad-
dling state lines.
" See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIM.
PROC., NOTES AND PROCEEDINGS at 145 (1946).
"5 Id. at 143-44.
88 The distance over the best highway between place of arrest and trial was used
in Evans v. United States, 325 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
881 (1965). The railroad timetables were used by one court to show the distance be-
tween Philadelphia and Baltimore to be less than 100 miles. See United States v.
Sineiro, 190 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1951).
[Vol. 131:1063
EXTRADITION LAW
B. Bars to Foreign Enforcement: The Requirements
of Venue and Vicinage
The historical bases for extradition do not justify the current blan-
ket ban on enforcement of a foreign state's criminal law. Specifically,
the traditional arguments would not support the refusal to join inter-
state compacts for mutual enforcement in socially and economically in-
tegrated metropolitan areas that happen to straddle state lines. Even
this modest proposal, however, would usually be barred by state consti-
tutional provisions pertaining to venue, or place of trial, and vicinage,
or geographical origin of jurors. In addition, such arrangements might
violate the federal Constitution.
1. State Constitutional Requirements
The constitutions of thirty-five states require either that the ac-
cused be tried in the county or district in which the crime was commit-
ted or by a jury of the county, vicinity, or vicinage or require a varia-
tion of both requirements.87  Most of the fifteen states that
constitutionally require only a "speedy trial by an impartial jury" with
no mention of vicinage or venue have by case law attached a venue or
vicinage requirement to the constitutional right to jury trial.88
Since there has been no effort by one state to apply the penal laws
of another, no cases interpret these constitutional provisions in a situa-
tion of contractual interstate cooperation through the application of for-
eign penal law. Two recent cases from New York and Florida, how-
ever, illustrate the dampening influence of peculiar jury trial
requirements upon any effort to devise an interstate compact for the
enforcement of sister state penal law by an asylum state.
In the New York case, People v. Moore,89 the defendant had been
87 A compilation of the relevant state constitutional provisions was published in
1926. See Levitt, Jurisdiction Over Crimes-I, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316, 331
n.46; see also George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 609, 630 (1966) (discussing the provisions). The chart remains accurate today,
when updated to include Alaska and Hawaii law. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11 (no
such requirements); HAWAII CONsT. art. I, § 11 (containing requirements). The
figures in the text derive from the 1926 compilation.
For example, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2, setting forth a right to jury trial, has
been interpreted as establishing a right of the accused to be tried in the county where
the crime was committed. This right was subject to legislative authority found in "the
law as it was when the bill of rights was adopted" to direct a location within the state
for a trial other than the county where the crime was committed. Mack v. People, 82
N.Y. 235, 237 (1880). New York law interpreting the New York jury trial provision is
summarized in People v. Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656, 660-61, 350 N.E.2d 604, 606-07,
385 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (1976).
86 46 N.Y.2d 1, 385 N.E.2d 535, 412 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1978).
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indicted, tried, and convicted of rape and sexual abuse with the offenses
occurring in the defendant's car while parked in Queens County near
the Kings County border. On appeal the defendant asserted that he had
a state constitutional right to be tried in the county where the crime
was committed. The defendant argued that the testimony clearly estab-
lished the location of the crime to be Queens County, thereby giving
him a right to trial in that county subject to the application of any New
York state legislation to the contrary.90 One such statute permitted
prosecution in any county through which a vehicle passes for an offense
committed in the vehicle during the trip. The defendant argued that the
crime was not committed during a trip, but rather at a point where the
vehicle was stationary in Queens County. The majority of four judges
on the New York Court of Appeals agreed that the private vehicle trip
statute was inapplicable and remanded the case to the trial court for a
new trial on the ground that a question of fact was presented as to
whether the crimes were committed within 500 yards of the boundary
between the two counties.9 1
The Florida case emphasized the state constitutional importance
attached to the requirement of vicinage. In Ward v. State,92 the trial
judge granted the state's motion for a change of venue because the trial
judge encountered shocking evidence of an effort by the defendants to
threaten or buy prospective jurors. The defendants were well known
and influential in the county, and one of them had previously been
convicted for jury tampering. The appellate court reversed the trial
judge because of the Florida constitutional provision guaranteeing per-
sons accused of crimes a "speedy and public trial by impartial jury in
the county where the crime was committed."9" The appellate court
noted that the constitutional provision was rooted in the jurors' histori-
cal role as witnesses of the disputed facts. This piece of history, en-
shrined in the Florida constitution, was the basis for the reversal of the
trial judge. "Strong as the evidence was of the difficulty of the task, the
impossibility of obtaining an impartial jury was not demonstrated by
an exhaustive effort to select such a jury from among the citizens of
Washington County.""
90 For the relevance of the statute to the constitutional question, see supra note
88.
91 This factual question that had to be developed in the course of a new trial
refers to another New York statute conferring authority to try a defendant in a county
when the offense is committed within 500 yards of the line of the county in which the
court sits. See N.Y. GRIM. PRoc. LAW § 20.40(4)(c) (McKinney 1981).
92 328 So. 2d 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
93 FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
" 328 So. 2d at 263.
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The venue and vicinage requirements of state constitutions reflect
the territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction. This theory limits the ap-
plication of penal statutes to the territorial borders of the enacting sov-
ereign. "The locus of the offense fixes jurisdiction. Find that and you
have the territory within which the courts have jurisdiction."95 As ap-
plied to court power, the territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction
means that the court conducts the trial of criminal prosecutions only for
those crimes committed within the territory assigned to the court. "As a
result, crimes are considered 'local' in nature, i.e., local to the territory
of the enacting sovereign and local to the territory of the enforcing
court." '96 The territorial commission theory also assumes that crime will
take place only in one place, the locality of residence of the accused.
97
Travel was difficult; communications and commerce rudimentary. "For
convenience of assembling evidence, and ensuring the attendance of wit-
nesses and allowing the neighbors of the vicinage to try the facts as
jurors, the place where the deed was done was obviously the most suita-
ble; and so a rule of venue grew into a principle of territorial
jurisdiction." '
Despite appeals for expanding the extraterritorial application of
state criminal law,99 critics have generally noted that the territorial
principle associated with state venue and vicinage requirements are ef-
fective barriers; they would thus bar the hypothetical compact among
states in many circumstances. These requirements have been called
"stupidity" by one critic10 and a "vestige from the past" by another.101
"To insist that criminal offenders should be tried only in the county
where the offense is committed because that happened to be the rule
500 years ago in England is nothing less than stupidity. . . .If an old
rule fails to fulfill its function it should be abolished."' 2 Notwithstand-
ing criticism of the requirements of venue and vicinage, they make ex-
traterritorial application of penal law virtually impossible.
In a number of states the peculiar form of the constitutional
jury-trial provision makes this sort of legislative reform diffi-
cult if not impossible, thus preserving in constitutional am-
" Levitt, supra note 16, at 324.
98 Kershen, Vicinage (Pt. 1), 29 OKLA. L. REv. 803, 811 (1976).
97Kershen, Vicinage (Pt. 2), 30 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 37 (1977).
93 P. JEssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 43-44 (1956).
" See, e.g., George, supra note 87, at 613-17; Perkins, The Territorial Principle
in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 1155, 1166-72 (1971); Rotenberg, supra note 12,
at 767-70; see also R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 230 (summarizing approaches).
100 Levitt, supra note 16, at 335.
101 George, supra note 87, at 635.
101 Levitt, supra note 16, at 335.
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ber the rote thinking of a day when legislatures and courts in
fact chose to utilize only the territorial principle in their law-
making. In these states, therefore, it may be necessary to
amend the constitution before it is possible to enact penal
legislation reaching conduct which cannot be tied to an iden-
tifiable place within the state borders."' 3
2. Federal Constitutional Requirements
Even if state constitutions presented no barrier to the hypothetical
compact among states, barriers would nonetheless remain. The federal
Constitution arguably would render the hypothetical compact infirm.
Recent attention to the requirement of local prosecutions has cen-
tered on state flexibility in this area and the implications of Duncan v.
Louisiana."' In Duncan, the Supreme Court held that defendants in
state criminal trials enjoy the right to jury trial specified by the sixth
amendment and applicable to the states by the fourteenth. The Court
rejected Louisiana's position that the states are not subject to the fed-
eral constitutional requirement to provide a jury trial in criminal
cases.10 5 After Duncan, the relevant question becomes whether the
sixth amendment's juror-residence requirement is also applicable to the
states through the fourteenth as a "procedure . . .necessary to an An-
glo-American regime of ordered liberty." '
The pre-Constitution common law features of a jury in criminal
cases included a "jury of the vicinage," which generally meant jurors
108 George, supra note 87, at 636.
104 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The post-Duncan cases have already begun to split on
whether the sixth amendment requires a jury of the vicinage for state prosecutions. In
People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705 (1973), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that as a result of Duncan, the vicinage
requirement of the sixth amendment also applied to state prosecutions. Jones was criti-
cized in Note, Does the Sixth Amendment Require a Jury of the Vicinage for State
Criminal Trials? A Functional Approach, 5 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 514 (1974).
Jones was rejected by the Third Circuit in 1980 as based on faulty reasoning. See
Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083
(1981).
Professor Wright has said that the distinction between venue and vicinage is a
"technical distinction" having "no importance." 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 301 (1982). As early as 1944, Professor Blume wrote: "The ten-
dency in modern law is to think of the place of trial rather than the place from which
the jury must be summoned." Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59, 92 (1944). These views have been
challenged in a thorough analysis of the legislative history of the adoption of the sixth
amendment and the function of a jury drawn from the community that is the locus of
the crime. See Kershen, supra note 96; Kershen, supra note 97.
105 See 391 U.S. at 149.
106 Id. at 149-50 n.14.
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drawn from the neighborhood where the deed was committed.10 7 The
common law requirement of vicinage was expressly included in the first
proposed draft of the sixth amendment, 08 but was considered too
vague.' 0 9 The debate led to the emergence of the sixth amendment,
which requires that the jury be "of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."' "0
The debate over juror-residence surrounding the adoption of the
sixth amendment is significant because article III of the Constitution
already stated a right to a jury trial."' The need to amend the Consti-
tution suggests that juror-residence was not considered within the scope
of what was constitutionally essential and, therefore, was not required
of the states or the federal government. The Supreme Court in Wil-
liams v. Florida"2 said that the failure of the drafters of the sixth
amendment to use language explicitly tying the jury concept to common
law requisites, such as "vicinage," manifested an intention to change
the common law concept of "jury.""'
Williams did not, however, present the question of the constitu-
tional necessity of juror-residence in state criminal trials. Two signifi-
cant features distinguish this question from that pertaining to the num-
107 See F. HELLER, SixTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 21 (1951). "Jury of
the vicinage" means jury of the neighborhood. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*350-51. For a statement of the English and colonial roots of the notion of "vicinage,"
see Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REV. 238,
239-40 n.3 (1931); Blume, supra note 104, at 60-78; George, supra note 87, at 635-36;
Kershen, supra note 96, at 805-43.
108 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
109 James Madison reported on the debate on the proposed amendment in a letter
to Edmund Pendleton on Sept. 23, 1789. "They [members of the Senate] are. . . in-
flexible in opposing a definition of the locality of Juries. The vicinage. . . is either too
vague or too strict a term." 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 492 (1884).
110 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11" "[Elven though the vicinage requirement was as much a feature of the com-
mon-law jury as was the 12-man requirement, the mere reference to 'trial by jury' in
Article III was not interpreted to include that feature." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 96 (1970) (citation omitted).
112 399 U.S. 78 (1970). For a discussion of the application of Williams to federal
criminal trials, see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 168 (1970).
"I [P]rovisions that would have explicitly tied the "jury" concept to the
"accustomed requisites" of the time were eliminated. Such action is con-
cededly open to the explanation that the "accustomed requisites" were
thought to be already included in the concept of a "jury." But that expla-
nation is no more plausible than the contrary one: that the deletion had
some substantive effect. Indeed, given the clear expectation that a substan-
tive change would be effected by the inclusion or deletion of an explicit
"vicinage" requirement, the latter explanation is, if anythin'g, the more
plausible.
399 U.S. at 96-97.
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ber of jurors, and suggest that juror-residence, at least from the state of
the locus of alleged crime, would be constitutionally mandated in state
criminal trials. First, the debate relating to vicinage did result in lan-
guage in the sixth amendment on juror-residence, which plausibly
amounts to a redefinition of vicinage in light of the territorial structur-
ing of the United States. In this light, juror-residence retains its consti-
tutional essentiality to jury trial. Furthermore, the contrasting silence
in debate on the number of jurors supports the view that redrafting of
the juror-residence requirement for the sixth amendment reflects an
understanding of the essentiality of juror-residence to jury trial.
Second, the jury number question in Williams presented a state
practice in which there were supporting state interests. Costs and de-
lays in convening a jury and the volume of state criminal trials support
the contention that states should not be controlled by an inflexible rule
requiring twelve persons on a jury.""' By contrast, asylum states cur-
rently do not try fugitive criminal defendants with jurors not residents
of the state in which the crime was allegedly committed. An analysis of
state interests and the existence of state practices are only peripherally
related to ascertaining the drafters' understanding of what procedures
were constitutionally essential to the right of jury trial in state criminal
cases under the sixth amendment. Yet the Supreme Court has already
stated the need to turn to other than historical considerations to deter-
mine what features of the jury system are constitutionally mandated in
state prosecutions." 5 The Court has examined the function performed
by the disputed state practice on jury trials and the relationship of that
function to the purposes of juries.1 16 The Court said that the jury
should ideally be "a representative cross-section of the community" and
that the jury's essential features are "the community participation and
shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of
guilt or innocence."11 7 The Court never defined the community, but
this language clearly suggests some community tie as an essential char-
acteristic of a jury for state criminal trials. The Court's long established
view of state criminal laws as expressing local policy1 suggests a com-
114 For a discussion of the state interests in convening juries with less than twelve
members, see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 112, at 166-67.
115 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 99.
118 See id. at 99-100.
"i Id. at 100.
118 The Court has long held that states are not obliged to recognize criminal judg-
ments of sister states under the full faith and credit clause. This issue usually arises in
cases involving an attempt at foreign execution of a money judgment that is essentially
a penalty. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 282-92 (1888). These early cases based their decisions on the
local nature of state criminal laws. See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 669.
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munity defined by residence in the state in which the crime was
committed.
A newly recognized value to maintaining criminal trials in the lo-
cus of the crime with a jury from the community has emerged. This
value has only recently been acknowledged and has appeared in cases
involving attempts to change the venue of criminal trials or to close
trials to all persons except parties and witnesses when they testify.
These cases state that maintaining criminal trials in the locus of the
crime serves significant therapeutic needs of the community. These
cases do not concentrate on knowledge of community factors by jurors,
but rather recognize a community interest in local trials of crimes that
occur within the community. Trials in the community of local criminal
matters, particularly shocking crimes, provide a substitute for the natu-
ral human reactions of outrage, protest and some form of vengeful self-
help. "The accusation and conviction or acquittal, as much perhaps as
the execution of punishment, operat[e] to restore the imbalance which
was created by the offense or public charge, to reaffirm the temporarily
lost feeling of security and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent 'urge to
punish.' "119
The community interest in local trials of local crimes was ex-
pressed in United States v. Means,120 in which the defendant attempted
to remove a criminal trial from the federal district of North Dakota
because of anti-Indian prejudice in the district. The court noted that
the federal rules relating to venue are rooted in the venue assurance in
article III, section 2 of the Constitution and the vicinage assurance in
the sixth amendment. 121 The historical development of these constitu-
tional assurances included the colonial concept that the community that
had suffered injury should judge those charged with the injury.'22 The
colonists were concerned with the royal interest in transferring officers
accused of crimes against the colonists for trial in England. The court
concluded that there was a community interest in the local trial of of-
fenses committed in the community. "The interest of a community that
those charged with violations of its laws, be tried in that community is
not a matter to be cast aside lightly."'12 The court concluded that in
light of the community interest in the trial of local crimes, the defen-
dant had not adequately shown that an impartial trial could not be held
119 Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1961).
120 409 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.D. 1976).
121 Id. at 117.
1122 C. WOOD, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 74 (1947).
123 409 F. Supp. at 117.
1088 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1063
within the district.
The opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Burger (joined by Jus-
tices White and Stevens) in the Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia1 24 case contains a more elaborate statement of the community in-
terest in the local trial of crimes. This case involved the fourth attempt
by the state of Virginia to try the defendant for the murder of a hotel
manager who had been stabbed to death. One conviction was reversed
because of improperly admitted evidence; the second trial ended in a
mistrial due to the lack of availability of an alternate juror. The third
trial also ended in a mistrial because a juror had read previous newspa-
per accounts of the earlier trials and told the other jurors of the con-
tents. At the beginning of the fourth trial, counsel for the defendant
moved that the trial be closed to the public; the prosecutor made no
objection. The appellant newspaper companies raised the question
whether the public has a constitutionally protected right to attend crim-
inal trials. Six of the Justices found such a right implicit in the first
amendment, but differed on whether such a right was absolute or sub-
ject to countervailing interests.
Chief Justice Burger noted that open criminal trials were not a
"quirk of history," but were long "recognized as an indispensable attri-
bute of an Anglo-American trial." '25 An open criminal trial was neces-
sary to permit the community to observe the system that operates as a
substitute for self-help and vengeance occasioned by crime within the
community. He noted that even before behavioral scientists articulated
the concept, the community "sensed from experience and observation
that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the means used
to achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance
of both the process and its results."1 26
A shocking crime results in collective outrage; the local public trial
provides an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. "Civ-
ilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the en-
forcement of criminal laws," but this does not "erase from people's con-
sciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done-or
even the urge for retribution. 1 2' A trial held at a place remote from
the commission of the crime would deny what Chief Justice Burger
called the "crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of jus-
tice." 1 28 Although the question raised in the Richmond Newspapers
12 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
125 Id. at 569.
126 Id. at 571.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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case was public access to trial, a strong element in finding a constitu-
tionally protected access to criminal trial was the local community in-
terest in the local trial of crimes committed within the community. The
intensity of that interest could similarly be recognized in construing
federal venue and vicinage requirements.
C. Summary
The hypothetical compact among states with common borders that
intersect population centers would probably be the most sensible and
appealing approach to the application by one state of the penal laws of
another state. Where the alleged criminal activity and the apprehension
occur in different states but within the same socially and economically
integrated population center, the inconveniences and expenses in de-
fending or prosecuting the criminal charge are manageable. Moreover,
the laws of the states party to the compact are likely to be compatible,
if not uniform, with respect to the conduct that is criminal, the sanc-
tions, and the general principles of criminal law, such as defenses of
mental disease or mistake. Finally, a member of the compact need not
be concerned with subjecting its citizens to egregious practices by for-
eign prosecuting states because the recently mandated common decen-
cies in investigation, trial, and sentencing are adequate protection
against state violations of civil rights.
Despite their appealing aspects, compacts among the states to ap-
ply penal laws of other states will not eliminate the need for an extra-
dition process. First, inconveniences to the accused and the state would
limit the usefulness of compacts to states with common borders inter-
secting population centers. Assuming all such states engaged in com-
pacts, this would affect apprehensions occurring in locations populated
by only one-fourth of the nation's population. Consequently, the full
use of compacts to apply penal laws of other states would not obviate
extradition in apprehensions occurring in locations populated by most
of the nation.
Even in the limited circumstances in which the hypothetical com-
pacts appear justified, state constitutional provisions concerning place of
trial and juror residence would bar the compacts. Assuming all of the
states with common borders intersecting population centers adopted
such compacts, thirty-three states would be involved.129 All of these
states have juror-residence or place-of-trial provisions in their constitu-
tions or case law.
129 See supra note 80.
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The interest in stability in the basic instrument of state govern-
ment results in substantial restrictions on constitutional change by leg-
islative proposal-by far the most commonly used method of amending
state. constitutions.13" These restrictions include the size of the legisla-
tive vote, the number of legislative sessions, and the size of the popular
vote required for ratification."3 ' They vary widely among the states.
For example, a three-fifths majority in the legislative vote is required to
propose a constitutional change in nine states, a two-thirds majority in
eighteen states, and a majority of the legislative membership in seven-
teen states."' 2 There is thus little prospect for the removal of state con-
stitutional venue and vicinage requirements that effectively block com-
pacts to apply penal laws of bordering states.
Apart from the substantial restrictions on the methods of initiating
state constitutional change, the community interest recently recognized
by the Supreme Court in the local trial of crimes would be a potent
federal base for opposing the removal of venue or vicinage
requirements.
II. THE CASE FOR REVISING EXTRADITION LAW
Extradition law stands in need of reform. The law is currently
unduly burdensome. Technological advances are placing increased pres-
sures on the current system. Moreover, recent legal developments sug-
gest that the cumbersome aspects of current law ought no longer to be
skirted by the expedients of "forced waivers" or simply ignoring the
Act. Finally, there are several other inadequacies with the current
procedure.
A. Cumbersomeness
The current extradition law is embodied in the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1926.133 Enacted in all but two
states as long as fifty years ago,'" the Act occupies a core position in
1 0 Of the four methods of initiating state constitutional change-legislative propo-
sal, constitutional initiative, constitutional convention, and constitutional commis-
sion-legislative proposal is by far the most commonly used method. See Table B, State
Constitutional Amendments Proposed and Adopted by Method of Initiation: 1970-79,
in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1980-81, at 3.
111 See Table 2, Constitutional Amendment Procedures: By the Legislature, in
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1976-77, at 175.
132 Id.
13 11 U.L.A. 59 (master ed. 1974).
134 For the compilation of citations to all state statutes adopting the Act, see 11
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the law of interstate transfer of not only fugitives but also other persons
indispensable to state criminal justice. The Act operates in tandem with
other statutes governing interstate transfer of persons indispensable to
state criminal justice. For example, when an officer of one state makes
an arrest in another state under the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, the
arrestee is held for extradition under the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act if the arrest is determined to be legal.""5
Despite the centrality of the Act to the administration of criminal
justice, the Act is woefully cumbersome in operation. Its procedures
reach far beyond the needs of interstate harmony and protection to the
individual. The cumbersome structure of the Act has provoked objec-
tions from the states.1 s6 Nevertheless, the Act remains substantially as
it was promulgated in 1926. Before extradition occurs under the cur-
rent act, action is necessary by at least nine agencies: in the asylum
state, by the police, a magistrate or judge, the attorney general, the
governor, and again a judge; and in the demanding state, by the prose-
cutor, the attorney general, the governor, and the secretary of state.1 37
Many of these agencies have no interest, or only an occasional interest,
in the prosecution underlying the retrieval. This unnecessary complex-
ity is particularly exasperating when the proposed retrieval is for a
short distance, such as in metropolitan areas spreading across state bor-
ders, in which case the traditional justifications for extradition do not
support resort to the process."3 '
B. Technological Advances
Warrant enforcement and fugitive retrieval have generally been
unrelated to traditional police patrol functions. A major empirical study
conducted in 1965 on police practices involving the decision to arrest 39
revealed that most arrest sequences are based on information sources
U.L.A. 51 (master ed. 1974 & Supp. 1982 at 15). Mississippi and South Carolina are
the only states that have not adopted the act. Extradition procedure is established in
Mississippi under Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 7-1-25 to -31, 99-21-1 to -11 (1972), and in
South Carolina under S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-9-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Such
procedures supplement the federal core of extradition law found under U.S. CONST. art
IV, § 2, cl. 2, and 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3182-3195 (West 1969).
"" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 852.3 (West 1970).
136 See POLICY POSITIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOvERNORS' CONFERENCE, 10
(1973); COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, NAT'L ASS'N OF ATToR-
NEYS GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 332-33 (1971).
"I" See Act §§ 3-4, 7, 10, 13-15, 23; e.g., KANSAS GOvERNOR's EXTRADITION
MANUAL 5 (1972) (role of attorney general in demanding state).
's See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
239 W. LAFAVE, ARREST; THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
(1965).
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other than warrant files. The files on wanted persons prior to 1965
were manually maintained, narrowly restricted in territorial coverage,
and usually not available in time to affect decisions by patrol officers to
arrest and detain. These files were primarily related to post-arrest mat-
ters, such as investigation, bail, or disposition.
A computerized file on persons wanted by police departments
throughout the nation was initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion on January 27, 1967, with the acronym NCIC (National Crime
Information Center). The use of this computerized file marked the be-
ginning of the integration of fugitive retrieval with ordinary police pa-
trol. There has been a decided shift from the early emphasis on com-
puter applications for crime statistic reporting and crime recordkeeping
to rapid retrieval of information for patrol officers, particularly infor-
mation on wanted persons.1 4 This development had been predicted in
a study by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.
141
The development of vehicle-installed terminals provided patrol of-
ficers with direct electronic access to computerized files on wanted per-
sons. Approximately 1,000 operational mobile digital terminals have
been installed in police patrol vehicles.1  Earlier studies projected that
police would install mobile digital terminals in one-half of the 75,000
police patrol units by 1983.143 The predictions of these studies have
been tempered by the high cost of the terminals, but planners continue
to believe that large municipal police departments will find that mobile
digital terminals are cost-effective.
1 44
Computerized files on wanted persons that are interconnected re-
gionally and nationally and are directly accessible to police patrols will
greatly expand the geographical range of police information on wanted
persons. Studies have shown increasing policy dependency upon these
new information systems.1 4 5 Pressure on the extradition process will
mount as police increase their activities in retrieval of wanted persons
across state lines.
140 Colton, The Use of Computers by Police: Patterns of Successes and Failures, in
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS
SYSTEMS 139 (1972).
141 AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH Co., LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNI-
CATIONS, 1970-75, A LONG RANGE STUDY (1966).
142 J. FIELDING & H. FREWING, STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS USER REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 5-30 (1977).
143 JET PROPULSION LABORATORY, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMUNI-
CATIONS REQUIREMENTS 6-29 & n.47 (1974).
144 J. FIELDING & H. FREWING, supra note 142, at 5-30.
145 See J. MURPHY, ARREST BY POLICE COMPUTER 1-10 (1976).
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C. Recent Legal Developments
The cumbersome quality of the Act has been ameliorated in the
past by inducing "forced waivers" of the procedural protections it af-
fords. In addition, the lack of meaningful remedies for failure to adhere
to the Act permitted law enforcement officials to ignore its cumbersome
provisions. Recent legal developments, however, suggest that the Act's
flaws can no longer be avoided by skirting its provisions.
1. "Forced Waivers"
States have circumvented the provisions of the Act by exacting
waivers from the person ggainst whom extradition is sought. Those
waivers clearly appear in some of the statutes that operate in tandem
with the Act. 4" For example, if a prisoner requests a hearing on a
detainer 147 filed by a foreign state under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, " 8 that request is deemed to be a waiver of extradition to
permit transfer to the foreign state for trial on the detainer or the
charges and return to the sending state to serve any new sentence on
the charge underlying the detainer. 49 Thus, if a prisoner wishes to
clear a detainer from a foreign state, he has no right to an initial hear-
ing in the imprisoning state on the nature and substantiality of the
charge underlying the detainer.
Similarly, the operation of the Extradition Act is avoided in cases
where one state seeks the return of a probationer or parolee under the
Interstate Compact for Parolees and Probationers." Both states
waived rights to insist upon extradition, 51 and the parolee or proba-
tioner waived extradition "in consideration of being granted [parole or
probation].' 2
Since the waiver of extradition has been a simple, successful device
for avoiding the expensive and cumbersome structure of the Extradition
Act, state legislatures have succumbed to the temptation to demand pre-
signed waivers of extradition as a quid pro quo for benefits in the crim-
146 See, e.g., supra note 135 and accompanying text.
147 See infra note 156 and accompanying text on prisoner's right to a hearing
prior to removal for trial on a detainer on request of prosecutor.
148 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL app. 47-56 (1967).
149 See id. at 52.
250 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE
CRIME CONTROL I (rev. ed. 1966).
15 Id. at 3.
152 Id. at 16. Section 2 of the rules promulgated under the compact requires use of
a form entitled "Agreement to return." The waiver of extradition is contained in this
form. id.
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inal process. The logical end to the aggressive demands for bargained
waivers would be waivers of extradition extracted from all persons as a
price for pre-trial release. Although unrecorded to date as a serious
suggestion, the full use of bargained waivers has a special attraction as
an alternative to the tedious extradition process. Bargained waivers,
however, are not the basis upon which the tedious extradition process
can be confidently tolerated. Although bargained waivers have been re-
cently held valid,"'3 a new series of cases suggests an unconstitutional
taint to the bargained waiver of extradition."'
The bargained waiver of extradition results in the loss of a consti-
tutional right to a hearing to justify the intrusion upon liberty involved
in an involuntary interstate journey. The Supreme Court has already
held that the right to a revocation hearing is enjoyed by parolees and
probationers under foreign state supervision.""5 The Court has also re-
cently interpreted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to include a
pre-transfer hearing for a prisoner before being transferred to another
state on request by a prosecutor from the foreign state. 5 '
The unconstitutional taint inheres in the process of the bargain by
which the right to an extradition hearing is waived. Waivers of consti-
tutional rights in criminal proceedings must be "made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently.115 7 Evidence that the waiver is extracted
from all persons who may be similarly situated in seeking out-of-state
parole or probation or pre-trial release shows that the bargain is an
illusion. Imprisonment or waiver of extradition is a choice without al-
ternatives. The Supreme Court has already indicated that evidence of
disparity in bargaining power is relevant to show that a waiver of a
constitutional right has been involuntarily made. 58
151 See State ex tel. Swyston v. Hedman, 288 Minn. 530, 531-32, 179 N.W.2d
282, 284 (1970); see also Young v. Griffin, 227 Ga. 133, 179 S.E.2d 160 (1971). Ear-
lier cases are Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942); Pierce v. Smith,
31 Wash. 2d 52, 195 P.2d 112 (1948).
1" See, e.g., In re Satterfield, 64 Cal. 2d 419, 421, 50 Cal. Rptr. 284, 285, 412
P.2d 540, 541 (1966) (transfer of prisoner to Florida penal institution so that he might
serve his California sentence concurrently with prior Florida sentence could not be
conditioned upon waiver of extradition in event California should seek prisoner's return
at time of his release in Florida); Thompson v. State, 482 P.2d 627, 628 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971) (the right to a speedy trial cannot be conditioned upon waiver of extradi-
tion procedure, and the duty of the state to extradite an accused incarcerated in another
jurisdiction is not obviated by the accused's failure to waive extradition).
155 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973).
15 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
157 Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
158 See, e.g., D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972). This
case involved waiver of a right to a hearing prior to the loss of property rather than
liberty. The Court assumed, however, that "the standard for waiver in a corporate-
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The waiver of extradition cannot be saved as a condition that may
be attached to a benefit provided to a person by a state as a matter of
grace. The Supreme Court has said that the extent of due process pro-
tection is not influenced by the characterization of the governmental
grant as a right or privilege.159 Rather it is "influenced by the extent to
which [the person] may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss' ,O by
the government's proposed summary action. The Court has singled out
the liberty of a parolee as an interest on which burdensome conditions
may not be placed: "It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with
[the problem of due process protections to parolees] in terms of whether
the parolee's liberty is a 'right' or a 'privilege.' "1
2. New Remedies
With the advent of fugitive retrieval as an ordinary police patrol
function through the computerization of wanted-persons files 62 has
also come an erosion of the legal doctrines that permitted police to vio-
late with impunity the provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act. The primary method of violating the Act has been the failure by
police to bring the fugitive before a judge for a judicial hearing prior to
delivery of the fugitive for interstate retrieval. In a number of state and
federal cases since the early 1970's, courts have considered claims
against state and federal officers who fail to comply with the rules gov-
erning the retrieval process. In these challenges, the validity of the
criminal process is questioned after an illegal interstate retrieval by fed-
eral or state police, or damages are sought against the officers person-
ally for the illegal retrieval.
A long line of cases has limited the remedies for violations of ex-
tradition requirements by law enforcement officials. In People ex rel.
Lehman v. Frye,13s a prisoner serving a sentence in Illinois was turned
over to authorities in Iowa without the prior hearing required under
section 11 of the Extradition Act. Following his acquittal in Iowa, the
prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus claiming that by failing to provide
the pre-extradition hearing Illinois had lost jurisdiction over his person.
The court ruled that "Section 11 of the Act makes it a misdemeanor to
property-right case of this kind is the same standard applicable to waiver in a criminal
proceeding, that is, that it be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made." Id. at 185.
169 Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (procedural due process
requires pretermination hearing to welfare recipients).
16o Id. at 263.
161 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
16I See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
1S 35 Ill. 2d 343, 220 N.E.2d 235 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1015 (1967).
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willfully disobey the [hearing requirement] . . but does not make the
violation a waiver of the right to regain and hold custody."' " In Frisbie
v. Collins,'"5 the Supreme Court considered a petition for habeas
corpus by a Michigan state prisoner who alleged that he had been
brought from Chicago, Illinois to Michigan for a criminal trial after
being handcuffed, blackjacked, and kidnaped by Michigan police of-
ficers in Chicago. The prisoner argued that because his arrest and ab-
duction violated both the due process clause and the Federal Kidnaping
Act,' 66 his subsequent conviction in Michigan was a nullity. The Su-
preme Court rejected both arguments, stating that "the power of a
court to try the accused is not impaired by the 'forcible abduction.' ,"'
The Court held that due process requirements were satisfied with
"constitutional procedural safeguards."' 68
Although Frisbie suggested that a remedy for the lawless behavior
of the police would have been prosecution under the Federal Kidnaping
Act,'69 that possibility can hardly be considered as having any deterrent
effect. 170 In 1974, however, the Second Circuit in United States v. Tos-
canino'7' rejected the holding and analysis in Frisbie as inconsistent
with "the expanded and enlightened interpretation [of due process] ex-
pressed in more recent decisions of the Supreme Court.' 7 2 After a jury
trial, Toscanino was convicted of conspiracy to import heroin. He did
not question the sufficiency of the evidence or claim any error in the
conduct of the trial. He argued, however, "that the entire proceedings
in the district court against him were void because his presence within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court had been illegally obtained."' 73
He complained that, at the behest of the United States, he had been
kidnaped from his home in Uruguay, tortured, and finally brought
against his will to New York. Relying on Frisbie, the district court held
"that the manner in which Toscanino was brought into the territory of
the United States was immaterial to the court's power to proceed, pro-
vided he was physically present at the time of the trial."' 74 But the
Second Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decisions in Rochin v.
184 Id. at 346, 220 N.E.2d at 237.
265 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
168 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976).
117 Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)).
168 Id.
169 See id. at 522-23.
1 0 There are no reports of direct action against police for violating extradition
statutes.
171 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
172 Id. at 275.
173 Id. at 269.
174 Id. at 271.
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California175 and Mapp v. Ohio17 6 "unmistakably contradict its pro-
nouncement in Frisbie.'' 177 The court ordered the case remanded to the
trial court for a hearing on Toscanino's allegations, and dismissal if the
allegations were proved.
On the basis of Toscanino's allegations, the result appears reason-
able, but the court's rationale is faulty. First, the court stated that the
"erosion" of Frisbie was "anticipated"1 8 by Rochin, in which the Su-
preme Court invalidated on due process grounds a conviction for pos-
session of drugs. The evidence had been obtained by forcing an emetic
into the defendant's stomach. Rochin does present a constitutionally
based remedy for the type of police brutality alleged in Toscanino, but
the difficulty with the assertion that Rochin undermines Frisbie is tim-
ing: Rochin was decided before Frisbie. Moreover, the alleged police
brutality in Toscanino (starvation, eyes and nose flushed with alcohol)
matched the brutality in Rochin (induced vomiting), and the result in
Toscanino could therefore have been limited to instances of egregious
police conduct. The opinion in Toscanino, however, does not distin-
guish retrievals tainted by procedural irregularity from retrievals ac-
companied by policy brutality.
Later pronouncements by the Second Circuit limit the Toscanino
rationale to cases of retrievals involving "government conduct of a most
shocking and outrageous character."179 Nevertheless, the availability of
a due process claim against the jurisdiction of a demanding state's court
175 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
176 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
177 500 F.2d at 274.
178 500 F.2d at 273. Several commentators have also argued that the Frisbie anal-
ysis may be inconsistent with other due process analyses. See Allen, Due Process and
State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. Rv. 16, 28 (1953) (although
the result in Frisbie is understandable in light of Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886),
and its progeny, the Court should have paid closer attention to the principles articu-
lated in Rochin in light of the alleged police conduct); Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poison-
ous Trees" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAUF. L. REv. 579, 600 (1968) (difficult to
conclude that Frisbie is consistent with Mapp and other cases establishing remedies for
official lawlessness); Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant Based
upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. REv. 91, 94-99 (1953) (due
process analysis in Frisbie was inconsistent with Rochin); The Supreme Court, 1951
Term, 66 HARv. L. REv. 89, 126-27 (1952).
179 United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
421 U.S. 1001 (1975). But see Benally v. Marcum, 89 N.M. 463, 553 P.2d 1270
(1976), in which the New Mexico Supreme Court prohibited a municipal court from
proceeding with a hearing on the violation of city traffic ordinances charged against an
Indian. The Indian had been arrested within the Navajo Reservation and removed to a
city for a hearing on the charges. The court concluded that this retrieval was illegal
because it violated the sovereignty of the Navajo tribe. Although there was no evidence
of brutality by the police, the court considered Toscanino to be a proper and applicable
approach to the problem of illegal arrests. Id. at 467, 553 P.2d at 1274.
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extradition clause of the Constitution.240 The reference to the state ex-
ecutive in the extradition clause and the federal implementing statute is
not sacrosanct. It appears that the reference was a vestige of the extra-
dition clause that appeared in the Articles of Confederation, 4  which
had literal meaning because "the Confederation was only a league of
separate sovereignties. '' 24 2 The Supreme Court, in discussing the role of
the executive in the extradition clause of the Articles of Confederation,
noted that "each State, within its own limits, held and exercised all the
powers of sovereignty; and the Confederation had no officer, either ex-
ecutive, judicial, or ministerial, through whom it could exercise an au-
thority within the limits of a State. '24 ' But the debate and changes
24'
in the extradition clause in the Constitution clearly establish the view
that this clause was not to have the marks of an extradition treaty
among nations.24 5 Moreover, there is evidence that the states extradited
fugitives through a judicial process before and after the adoption of the
Constitution.246 Thus, rather than reduce the power of the states to
engage in extradition, the Constitution apparently mandated its exer-
cise by establishing a minimum level of cooperation between the
states.247
240 This assumes, of course, that the complete extradition process resulting from
the change would operate as expeditiously as that prescribed by federal extradition law
and with sufficient uniformity to preclude asylum status for any state. But cf. Crumley
v. Snead, 620 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The framers . . . envisioned that the
governors of the states would play the primary role in effectuating extradition. As the
Supreme Court recently reiterated, '[ijnterstate extradition was intended to be a sum-
mary and mandatory executive proceeding ... ' [Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282,
289 (1978)] (emphasis added.)").
241 The interstate extradition clause in the Articles of Confederation read:
If any person guilty of, or charged with treason, felony, or other high
misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice and be found in any of
the United States, he shall, upon demand of the governor or executive
power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the
State having jurisdiction of his offense.
U.S. CONST. of 1778, art. 4., reprinted in M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDER-
ATION 263-64 (1963).
242 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 103 (1860).
243 Id.
24 See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
245 Another indication that the extradition clause in the Constitution does not
mandate a role for the executive in extradition between states comes from a plan for a
constitution, which was not submitted to the Convention but which expresses the per-
sonal opinion of Alexander Hamilton, one of the two delegates from New York. 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. OF 1787, supra note 228, at 699. The pro-
posed extradition clause found in article IX, § 6, mentions neither state governors nor
chief executives. Id. at 629.
246 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 597 (1840) (Catron, J., separate opin-
ion); 2 J. MOORE, supra note 211, § 517.
2 4 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 597 (1840) (Catron, J., sepa-
rate opinion).
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D. The Statutory Hearing and Habeas Corpus to Challenge
Extradition or Rendition
The new Act establishes a right to a judicial hearing to contest
either a request for rendition or a demand for extradition with the
hearing to be held before a judge in the asylum state prior to transfer.
Under the existing Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the ordinary
method of challenge is by application for the extraordinary writ of
habeas corpus to a judge in the asylum state. Although recently some
doubt has been expressed as to the exact source of the right to use
habeas corpus to challenge state retrieval,24 this practice has been
widely employed in extradition law.
The comment following section 3-106 of the new Act clearly indi-
cates that the use of the judicial hearing is the preferred method to test
either extradition or rendition. Two reasons support this view: (1) the
impropriety of using the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus as the
statutorily directed method to challenge a confinement during the ordi-
nary operation of the statute, and (2) the opportunity to define the is-
sues to be raised at the hearing-an opportunity not available with the
writ of habeas corpus. None of the other compacts or uniform acts that
bear on the transfer of persons across state lines for state criminal jus-
tice use the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus as the statutorily man-
dated method of challenging confinement. Rather, many of these com-
pacts or acts set forth a hearing on particular issues that reflect the
operation of the act or compact. 49
Nonetheless, in establishing a right to a judicial hearing to contest
an extradition or rendition, the drafters did not intend, nor would it be
constitutionally permissible, to eliminate the right to habeas corpus re-
view of a detention in the asylum state under an extradition or rendi-
tion. Habeas corpus review of the detention may only be replaced or
superseded to the extent that the replacement judicial proceeding covers
the issues triable in a habeas corpus proceeding and affords the accused
an adequate and effective remedy. 50 Under the new Act, the only is-
sues that may be raised in the statutorily designed hearing are (1) iden-
tity and (2) sufficiency of the documents from the demanding state. If
the accused wishes to argue other issues, such as the unconstitutionality
of the charge for which he is being retrieved by the demanding state, a
habeas corpus hearing would be the only forum for raising the issue
248 See Crumley v. Snead, 620 F.2d 481, 483 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980).
24 New Act § 3-106 comment.
250 Id.
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before transportation to the demanding state.2 51
E. Absence of Any Need to Allege that the
Accused Was a "Fugitive"
In Michigan v. Doran,2 52 the Supreme Court was concerned with
Michigan's review of the prior determination by a neutral judicial of-
ficer of the demanding state, Arizona, that probable cause existed to
believe that the accused had committed a crime in Arizona. The court
held that "review in the asylum state of issues that can be fully litigated
in the charging state would defeat the plain purposes of the summary
and mandatory procedures authorized by Art. IV, § 2."25' The Court
stated that a judge in the asylum state had only a limited number of
issues to consider in any challenge to a fugitive retrieval, one of which
was "whether the petitioner is a fugitive." 54 The proposed Uniform
Criminal Extradition and Rendition Act does not require an allegation
of flight in either the demand for extradition (section 3-101) or in the
request for rendition (section 4-101). Furthermore, the proposed Act
does not include flight as an issue that may be raised in the statutorily
designed hearing to challenge either extradition or rendition (sections 3-
107 and 4-106). Although the Michigan case did not involve any issue
with respect to the flight of the accused, the comment by the Supreme
Court deserves discussion because of the absence of any requirement of
an allegation of flight in the proposed Act.
The issue of flight in the context of the extradition process has its
roots in the language of section 2 of article IV of the Constitution: "A
Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony or other Crime who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand
'5' In a recent per curiam opinion, the Court substantially limited the number of
issues that may be raised through a habeas corpus challenge to detention in the asylum
state. In Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86 (1980) (per curiam), a fugitive had escaped
from an Arkansas prison and was located in California. The fugitive sought to have the
California courts consider the conditions of the prison in Arkansas. The Supreme Court
of California issued a writ of habeas corpus directing a lower California court to "con-
duct hearings to determine if the penitentiary in which Arkansas seeks to confine peti-
tioner is presently operated in conformance with the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and thereafter to decide the petition on its merits." Id. at 87.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of California,
holding that the claims as to the constitutional defects in the Arkansas penal system
"should be heard in the courts of Arkansas, not those of California." Id. at 88. In its
broadest sense, this case can be read to preclude review in the asylum state through a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus of any issues that can be fully litigated in the
charging state.
253 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
253 Id. at 290.
25 Id. at 289.
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of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." The
language of this provision became the source of two questions that long
impeded the power of states to gain custody of persons from other states
in aid of state criminal justice. First, does this language require as a
predicate for extradition that the accused consciously flee from criminal
justice of the demanding state? Second, is the presence of the accused in
the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime a predi-
cate to the extradition of the accused from the asylum state?
It is settled law that state power to extradite does not turn on how
and why the accused happened to be in the asylum state. In Appleyard
v. Massachusetts,255 a 1906 Supreme Court opinion, the accused ar-
gued that he could not be extradited from Massachusetts to New York
because New York failed to show that he had consciously fled from
justice in New York. The basis of the argument was the wording of the
Constitution describing the person who was subject to extradition as "a
person . . . who shall flee from justice." The Supreme Court ruled
that departure from the demanding state "no matter for what purpose
or for what motive, nor under what belief,"2 6 is sufficient to establish
flight from justice. Therefore, if the accused is located in another state,
the demanding state's interest in custody should not be determined in
any manner by the method or motivation of the accused in leaving the
demanding state and going to the asylum state. 5
Apart from how and why the accused left the demanding state,
state power to retrieve an accused is not predicated upon the presence
of the accused in the demanding state at the time of the commission of
the crime. State criminal justice would be substantially obstructed
should state power to extradite be predicated upon the presence of the
accused in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime. A substantial percentage of the nation's population lives
in socially and economically integrated areas that are intersected by
state lines.258 These demographic trends, together with modern commu-
nication and transportation, facilitate the commission of crimes in other
jurisdictions.
The federal core of extradition law applies only to alleged
criminals present in the demanding state at the time of the commission
of the crime.259 If. the federal nucleus of extradition law were read to
255 203 U.S. 222 (1906).
258 Id. at 227.
217 See also Hogan v. O'Neill, 225 U.S. 52 (1921).
258 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
259 Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903).
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operate an exclusive procedure to be followed precisely by the states,.
the state criminal justice systems would be seriously threatened by the
inability of the states to reach alleged criminals who commit crimes
within their borders, but who operate outside the state borders. Section
6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act expanded state power to
extradite to cases where "the accused was not in the [demanding] state
at the time of the commission of the crime, andhas not fled therefrom."
The United States Supreme Court has observed that this section "pro-
vides for rendition of alleged criminals whose conduct does not bring
them within the constitutional extradition provision."260
This power of states to reach alleged criminals beyond those cov-
ered by the constitutional extradition provision has long been upheld.
Justice Traynor, in In re Cooper,261 set forth the rationale for state
power to extradite persons who act in one state to commit crimes in
another state and, therefore, have not fled from the demanding state.
Justice Traynor noted that modern communication and transportation
can facilitate the commission of crimes across the state line, and that a
criminal who acts in one state to commit crimes in another may pose a
far more serious problem than one who commits a crime and then flees
the state. When the person who commits a crime entirely in one state
flees, that person ordinarily poses no threat of additional crimes. In
discussing the person who acts in one state to commit a crime in an-
other, Justice Traynor said:
In contrast, the criminal who operates from without the
state's borders poses a continuing threat. Since his conduct
may be undetected or apparently harmless in the state where
he acts, the only effective impetus for prosecution may come
from the state that suffers the harm. Far more divisive than
a state's refusal to extradite a fugitive for a past offense
would be its unwitting provision not only of a base of opera-
tions but of an asylum for those who commit crimes without
being personally present at the place where their crimes are
consummated.28 2
F. Probable Cause as a Basis to Justify Fugitive Retrieval
The new Act establishes a judicial hearing to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a
260 New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 10 (1958).
261L 53 Cal. 2d 772, 349 P.2d 956, 3 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1960).
262 Id. at 776, 349 P.2d at 958, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
1983]
1114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
crime in the demanding state and that the accused is in another state.
The proposed Act does not carry forward the unclear test in section 3
of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act applicable to documents sub-
mitted by the demanding state. Under that section, the documents sub-
mitted by the demanding state must "substantially charge the person
demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state."
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, state
courts used either this test or a probable cause test to justify arrest to
extradite.26
Under the new Act, all demands for extradition or requests for
rendition must include an arrest warrant based upon a decision of an
issuing authority (not connected with police or prosecution) that there
is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the accused committed it. This requirement represents a choice favoring
probable cause over the "charge rule" as the test to justify arrests to
extradite. The language requiring that documents substantially charge
the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of
the demanding state is omitted.
There are three reasons for the choice of the "probable cause" test
instead of the "charge" test. First, the requirement of an arrest warrant
based upon probable cause would satisfy the fourth amendment re-
quirement of independent determination of probable cause as a prereq-
uisite to pre-trial custody. The absence of such an explicit requirement
of a finding of probable cause in the demanding state renders section 3
of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act vulnerable to constitutional
attack. In Gerstein v. Pugh,2 the Court held that the fourth amend-
ment requires a timely independent determination of probable cause as
a prerequisite to pre-trial detention. The Court rejected the view that
the prosecutor's decision to file an information was itself a determina-
tion of probable cause that furnished sufficient reason to detain a defen-
dant pending trial. The prosecutorial judgment standing alone did not
meet the requirements of the fourth amendment. This problem is elimi-
nated in the proposed Act by requiring a finding of probable cause by a
person independent of police and prosecution as a prerequisite to all
attempts to retrieve persons from asylum states.
Second, to be consistent with the Supreme Court's recent interpre-
tation of the extradition provision in the Constitution, the issue of prob-
able cause should be raised in the forums of the demanding state, not
the asylum state.265 The Act's requirement that the demanding state
23 New Act § 3-101 comment.
2- 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
265 See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
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provide an arrest warrant will resolve the conflict about whether prob-
able cause is necessary for extradition and what forms are needed.26
Finally, the requirement of an arrest warrant based upon a find-
ing of a probable cause would protect persons from the use of the ex-
tradition process for the enforcement of private claims. The person sub-
jected to an extradition procedure logically requires the same degree of
constitutional protection that is given to an arrestee in a non-extradition
context.
G. Burden of Proof
In the hearing to challenge either extradition or rendition, the pro-
posed Act requires that the judge find that the proper documentation
for the demand has been submitted by the state seeking custody of the
accused. In addition, the Act states that the judge "shall issue an order
to transfer custody . . . unless the arrested person establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that he is not the requested (or demanded)
person. 1 82 7 Therefore, the Act places upon the accused the burden of
proof on the issue of identity in the hearing to challenge extradition or
rendition and sets that burden at the level of "clear and convincing"
evidence.
This allocation of burden and level of proof is consistent with
overwhelming case law. At least thirty-three of thirty-eight states have
similarly placed the burden during habeas corpus hearings in which an
accused challenged extradition under the Uniform Criminal Extradi-
tion Act. 268 There appear to be five states that either placed the burden
268 Conpare Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967) with Garrison v.
Smith, 413 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
267 Act §§ 3-107, 4-106.
28 ALABAMA: Smith v. State, 45 Ala. App. 423, 231 So. 2d 345 (Grim. App.
1970) (no quantum specified). Krenwinkel v. State, 45 Ala. App. 474, 232 So. 2d 346
(Crim. App. 1970) (burden is clear and convincing).
ARIZONA: Ex parte Riccardi, 68 Ariz. 180, 203 P.2d 627 (1949) (issue is fugi-
tivity-burden is clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt).
ARKANSAS: Wilkins v. State, 258 Ark. 578, 528 S.W.2d 382 (1975) (burden is
"practically conclusive").
COLORADO: Briddle v. Caldwell, 628 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1981) (burden is clear
and convincing).
CONNECTICUT: Ross v. Hegstrom, 157 Conn. 403, 254 A12d 556 (1969) (issue
is fugitivity-burden is "conclusively").
DELAWARE: Dickerson v. State, 267 A.2d 881 (Del. 1970) (issue is fugitiv-
ity-burden is clear and convincing).
FLORIDA: Kohler v. Sandstrom, 305 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (bur-
den is "competent proof").
GEORGIA: Bryant v. Griffin, 220 Ga. 154, 137 S.E.2d 640 (1964) (issue not
specifically identity, but in general accused's burden is to show some "valid and suffi-
cient reason" why warrant should not be executed).
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of proof on the state on the issue of identity or shift the burden back to
IDAHO: Walton v. State, 98 Idaho 442, 566 P.2d 765 (1977) (issue is fugitiv-
ity-burden is clear and convincing).
ILLINOIS: People ex rel. James v. Lynch, 16 Ill. 2d 380, 158 N.E.2d 60 (1959)
(burden is on accused on issue of identity; no quantum mentioned). People ex rel.
Webb. v. Babb, 5 Ill. 2d 35, 123 N.E.2d 822 (1955) (issue is fugitivity-burden is dear
and convincing).
INDIANA: Meek v. State, 262 Ind. 618, 321 N.E.2d 205 (1975) (burden is "af-
firmative evidence").
IOWA: Hill v. Houck, 195 N.W.2d 692 (Iowa 1972) (issue is fugitivity-burden
is clear and satisfactory or conclusive).
KANSAS: King v. Hawes, 224 Kan. 335, 580 P.2d 1318 (1978) (not specifically
identity but generally petitioner has burden; no quantum mentioned).
KENTUCKY: Galloway v. McClard, 316 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1958) (not specifi-
cally identity but generally petitioner has burden; no quantum mentioned).
MAINE: Torrey v. Williams, 388 A.2d 921 (Me. 1978) (burden by statute is
clear and convincing).
MARYLAND: Ray v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail, 13 Md. App. 61, 281 A.2d
125 (1971) (burden is beyond a reasonable doubt).
MICHIGAN: Williams v. Wayne Sheriff, 395 Mich. 204, 235 N.W.2d 552
(1975) (issue is whether a crime is charged-equally divided court-dissent sets burden
at clear and convincing).
MINNESOTA: State v. Limberg, 274 Minn. 31, 142 N.W.2d 563 (1966) (issue
is fugitivity-burden is clear and satisfactory or conclusively). State ex rel. Swyston v.
Hedman, 288 Minn. 530, 179 N.W.2d 282 (1970) (burden on issue of identity is same
as burden in Limberg).
MISSISSIPPI: Crumpton v. Owen, 376 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1979) (issue is fugitiv-
ity-burden is conclusive, beyond a reasonable doubt, or clear and convincing).
MISSOURI: Williams v. Robertson, 339 Mo. 34, 95 S.W.2d 79 (1936) (issue is
fugitivity-burden is substantial and convincing).
MONTANA: In re Hart, 178 Mont. 235, 583 P.2d 411 (1978) (burden is beyond
a reasonable doubt).
NEBRASKA: Dovel v. Adams, 207 Neb. 766, 301 N.W.2d 102 (1981) (burden
on issue of identity is on accused; no quantum mentioned). In re Austin, 186 Neb. 815,
186 N.W.2d 723 (1971) (issue is fugitivity-burden is apparently conclusive but note
discrepancy between syllabus and text).
NEVADA: Marshall v. Sheriff, Clark County, 87 Nev. 455, 488 P.2d 1157
(1971) (issue is not specifically identity but generally burden is on petitioner; no quan-
tum mentioned).
NEW JERSEY: In re DeGina, 94 N.J. Super. 267, 228 A.2d 74 (on identity,
burden is on accused; on fugitivity, burden is clear and convincing), petition for certifi-
cation denied, 49 N.J. 368 (1967).
NEW YORK: People ex rel. Drake v. Oslwyn, 51 A.D.2d 240, 380 N.Y.S.2d 666
(1976) (burden is clear and convincing).
OHIO: In re Rowe, 67 Ohio St. 2d 115, 423 N.E.2d 167 (1981) (issue is fugitiv-
ity-burden is beyond a reasonable doubt).
OKLAHOMA: In re Harrell, 448 P.2d 289 (Okla. Grim. App. 1968) (issue is
fugitivity-burden is clear and convincing).
OREGON: State'ex rel. Zitek v. Clark, 244 Or. 111, 416 P.2d 3 (1966) (issue is
fugitivity-burden is conclusive).
SOUTH DAKOTA: State ex rel. Hall v. Hawkey, 263 N.W.2d 141 (S.D. 1978)
(issue not specifically identity but generally accused has burden; no quantum
mentioned).
TENNESSEE: State ex rel. Lingerfelt v. Gardener, 591 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1979) (issue is fugitivity-burden is beyond a reasonable doubt).
UTAH: Santina v. Larson, 593 P.2d 137 (Utah 1979) (burden is clear and
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the state when the accused raised a prima facie case contesting iden-
tity.2 69 These decisions appear to be inconsistent with prior Supreme
Court opinions allocating the burden of proof to the accused on issues
raised in a habeas corpus hearing to contest an extradition. In South
Carolina v. Bailey,270 the Supreme Court held that the accused has the
burden of proof and must show absence from a state by clear and satis-
factory evidence.
Considering the Constitution and statute and the declara-
tions of this Court, we may not properly approve the dis-
charge of the respondent unless it appears from the record
that he succeeded in showing by clear and satisfactory evi-
dence that he was outside the limits of South Carolina at the
time of the homicide. Stated otherwise, he should not have
been released unless it appeared beyond reasonable doubt
that he was without the State of South Carolina when the
alleged offense was committed ... 2 1
H. Controlling Unnecessary Delay in the Retrieval Process
A distant removal from one state to another works a hardship
upon the accused, and there is a natural desire to prevent it when pos-
sible.2 2 The new Act sets forth the right to a hearing to challenge ex-
tradition or rendition; moreover, the statutorily designed hearing does
not supersede the right of the accused to file an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the courts of the asylum state.273
At the same time, the new Act seeks to curb destructive delay of
fugitive retrievals by denying appeals of orders to transfer custody.274
Denial of an appeal from an order to transfer custody is analogous to
the federal removal procedure. Since removal orders under rule 40 of
convincing).
VERMONT: Russell v. Smith, 127 Vt. 225, 245 A.2d 563 (1968) (issue is "sub-
stantially charged"; burden is on accused; no quantum mentioned).
WISCONSIN: State ex rel. Clayton v. Wolke, 69 Wis. 363, 230 N.W.2d 869
(1975) (burden is clear and convincing).
269 See In re Moore, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 399, 313 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1974); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Colcough v. Aytch, 227 Pa. Super. 527, 323 A.2d 359 (1974); Sal-
vail v. Sharkey, 108 R.I. 163, 271 A.2d 814 (1970); Ex parte Nelson, 594 S.W.2d 67
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979); State ex rel. Gonzales v. Wilt, 256 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1979).
270 289 U.S. 412 (1933).
271 Id. at 421-22; see also Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905).
272 R. HARDY, REMOVAL OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS 91 (1929) (summarizing the
sentiments of the Supreme Court in Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U.S. 20 (1907)).
273 See supra text accompanying note 250.
217 New Act §§ 3-107(c), 4-106(c).
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are interlocutory, there is no
direct appeal, even in cases of removals over thousands of miles .1 5 Fur-
thermore, equitable remedies and mandamus cannot be used to circum-
vent the prohibition against the appeal from a removal order.2"'
I Since the federal removal order is not appealable, it became a fre-
quent practice to apply for writs of habeas corpus as a substitute for
direct appeal. As a final delay tactic, an appeal would be taken from an
order dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Congress abol-
ished appellate review of habeas corpus proceedings testing the validity
of removal orders.177 The new Act does not refer to the question of the
appealability of orders issuing from a habeas corpus proceeding; rather,
it simply denies appeals from orders to transfer that emanate from the
statutorily designed hearing.
I. Payment of Transportation and Subsistence Expenses
The proposal that the court in the demanding state have discretion
to award transportation and subsistence to a person discharged or ac-
quitted after extradition over a great distance278 is not unprecedented.
This subject was first raised by the drafters of the federal removal rule.
It was thought that financial hardship to a person occasioned by release
after retrieval over a great distance itself creates a menace to local law
enforcement.
One of the problems that arises in the removal procedure is
taking the defendant a considerable distance from his home
and then if he is discharged or acquitted they leave him there
and he has to get his own way home. That causes a great
deal of trouble, particularly if it is a considerable distance
and it sometimes makes the man something of a menace to
law enforcement.279
The proposal for payment of return transportation and subsistence to a
person released after a distant extradition may be regarded as excessive
protection to the person who was once an alleged fugitive. On the other
hand, the payment, if any, is decided by the court and is responsive to
the occasional predicament of penury caused by state extradition, for
275 See Galloway v. United States, 302 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1962).
17 See Frost v. Yankwich, 254 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1958); see also In re Ellsburg,
446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971).
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1951).
'78 See New Act § 5-105.
179 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIM.
PROC., supra note 84, at 145.
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which the state morally should provide relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
This country needs domestic extradition law. The current extradi-
tion system, however, badly requires revision. The proposed Uniform
Extradition and Rendition Act meets the need for reform and therefore
should be adopted by the states.

